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CORPORATE FRANCHISE TAX: APPORTIONING THE VALUE OF GOODS IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 6 Cal. App. 3d 149,
85 Cal. Rptr. 890, appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 913 (1970)
Plaintiff-taxpayer Montgomery Ward, an Illinois corporation doing
business in California and other states, was assessed an annual corporate
franchise tax by the State of California. The tax was measured by net
income "attributable" to California and determined by means of a three
factor apportionment formula comprising the average ratio of tangible
property, payroll, and sales within the state to tangible property, payroll,
and sales in all states.' In computing the property factor, the value of
all the taxpayer's tangible property located in all states constituted the
denominator. The numerator included, over the taxpayer's objections,
the value of goods in transit to California in interstate commerce. The
taxpayer contended that the inclusion of the value of the goods in
interstate commerce in the numerator resulted in measuring the tax by
extra-territorial values in violation of the due process and commerce
clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The trial court denied relief. On appeal,
held: Affirmed. Inclusion of the value of goods in interstate commerce
in transit to the state in the numerator of a three factor formula for
apportioning net income for a corporate franchise tax does not
contravene the due process and commerce clauses of the U.S.
Constitution.2
Montgomery Ward is another example of the conflict in the field of
interstate commerce between two objectives: the proper division of taxes
among the states3 and the maintenance of a free flow of interstate
commerce. 4 The long recognized inadequacy of the judicial process to
resolve the multifarious interstate taxation problems 5 prompted a study,
1. For an excellent treatment of the principle of allocation of business income and the theory and
application of apportionment formulas see generally G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION
OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION (2d ed. 1950). The apportionment formula utilized by California
may be illustrated thus:
In-state property In-state sales In-state payroll+ +
total property total sales total payroll
X total net income X Rate = Tax
3
2. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 6 Cal. App. 3d 149, 85 Cal. Rptr. 890,
appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 913 (1970).
3. W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES To OTHER STATES 1 (1963).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1964).
5. The following Justices, writing or concurring in the opinions indicated, have recognized this
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leading to the proposal of the Interstate Taxation Act7 by the House
Judiciary Committee and prompted the approval of the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.8
inadequacy: Black, McCarrall v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940) (dissenting
opinion), Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 448-55 (1939) (dissenting
opinion), J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Stoven, 304 U.S. 307, 327 (1938) (dissenting opinion); Clark,
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959); Douglas,
McCarrall v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, supra at 188-89 (dissenting opinion); Frankfurter, McCarrall
v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, supra at 188-89 n. 24 (dissenting opinion), Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 475-77 (1959) (dissenting opinion); Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944) (dissenting opinion); Jackson, Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 306-07 (1944) (concurring opinion); Rutledge in an opinion
covering three cases, International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 360
(1944) (concurring opinion), General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 360 (1944)
(concurring opinion), McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 360 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
6. H.R. REP. No. 1450, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1964).
7. H.R. REP. No. 7906, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). Title II of § 201 of the Act provides
that a state may not impose on a corporation doing business in more than one state a tax in
excess of that calculated by a two factor formula of property and payroll. With respect to the
property factor, § 202(a) of the proposed statute provides:
A corporation's property factor for any State is a fraction, the numerator of which is the
average value of the corporation's property located in that state. . . . (emphasis added)
This provision appears to require that property not physically located in the state be excluded
from the numerator of the property factor. If this interpretation is adopted, the Montgomery Ward
holding would be made obsolete. However, the California statute in Montgomery Ward required
the property to have a "situs" in the state and situs was there interpreted to include goods in
interstate commerce which were "appropriated for the production of income in the state. See notes
9 and 25 infra. A similar interpretation of the proposed Interstate Taxation Act seems unlikely,
but the word "physically" could be inserted between the words "not located" to avoid a decision
like Montgomery Ward. On the other hand, if the term is to be interpreted as was "situs" in
Montgomery Ward, changes should be made to avoid potential litigation on this issue.
8. The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes § 10, 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED
(1957) contains a property factor defined as follows:
The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the average value of the
taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used in this state during
the tax period. . . (emphasis added).
There are apparently no decisions under this act on the issue in Montgomery Ward. However
the Act may be reasonably interpreted in two ways, each yielding a conclusion contrary to that
in Montgomery Ward. The word "owned" can be read with "and used in this state". This
interpretation would appear to exclude goods in interstate commerce because they are not owned
in the state and because they are not used in the state. If the word "owned" is read only with
"in this state", potential problems may arise because title may be in the name of a taxpayer's
in-state operation. It is also possible, but unlikely, that "used in this state" could be interpreted
as was "situs" in Montgomery Ward to mean "appropriated for the production of income" in
the state. See note 25 infra. These potential interpretations suggest that a modification of the act
for clarity is in order. In January, 1971 advisory regulations were proposed for adoption by the
Multistate Tax Commission which could eliminate the statutory construction problems but not
the constitutional problems. The regulations specifically provide that the numerator of the property
factor includes "property in transit between locations of the taxpayer . . . shall be considered to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss3/10
CORPORATE FRANCHISE TAX
A fundamental limitation on state taxing power is that property
physically located outside the state may not be taxed? The tax involved
in Montgomery Ward was not a property tax but a corporate franchise
tax measured by net income and apportioned in part on the basis of a
property factor. 0 The taxpayer did not contend that this in-transit
property was taxed; nor would such an argument be persuasive in light
of the principles espoused by the Supreme Court in International
Harvester Co. v. Evatt.1 ' There the taxpayer claimed that the state was
taxing sales made outside its borders. The Court replied:
A complete answer . . . is that Ohio did not tax these sales. Its statute
imposed the franchise tax for the privilege of doing business in Ohio for
profit. The fact that it chose to measure . the tax by the value of
the goods. . . does not transform it to something else.' 2
be at the destination for purposes of the property factor. P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES
UNIT 6185 (1971). California adopted these regulations on May 11, 1971. CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE §§ 25120-39 (West 1970). 1 CCH STATE TAX REP., CALIF. 12-419 (1971). For an analysis
of the development of formulary apportionment in California see Boren, Separate Accounting in
California and Uniformity in Apportioning Corporate Income, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 478, 481
(1971).
The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act has been substantially adopted in the
following jurisdictions: Alabama, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia.
West Virginia adopted the provisions of the Act applicable to corporate nonbusiness income only.
Michigan adopted the provisions the Act applicable to franchise and intangibles taxes only. CCH
ALL STATES TAX GUIDE 1029.
9. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925). Limitations on the power of a state to tax beyond
its jurisdiction were recognized prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. Case of the
State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300 (1872); Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1869); Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855). Following
the adoption of the amendment, limitations similar in nature came to be expressed in due process
terms. See, e.g., Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra, Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940);
for an early treatment of this development. See Bird, The Evolution of Due Process of Law in
the Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 37, 41 (1913). Commerce
clause limitations on state taxing power have existed since Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
419 (1827). Chief Justice Marshall set the stage for Brown in McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) and Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Some cases and
authorities suggest that the two clauses are intertwined in application. See, e.g., Ott v. Mississippi
Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 403 (1936); American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919);
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905). Others suggest that they should
be separately applied because they present different limitations on state taxing power. See, e.g.,
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 n. 5 (1968); International
Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). For a
general discussion of the relationship between the two clauses see P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION
OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 13 (1953).
10. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23151 (West 1949).
II. 329 U.S.416 (1947).
12. Id. at 420.
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Two clearly identifiable constitutional tests have evolved as
limitations on state taxing power. The threshold test, called the "nexus"
test,13 requires that the "taxing power exerted by the state bear fiscal
relation to the protection, opportunities and benefits given by the
state."' 4 This test answers the question of whether the state may impose
any tax and requires some "definite link" between the taxpayer's
activities and the taxing state.'5 It is clear Montgomery Ward has
substantial activities within the state of California due to its ownership
of property and operation of its retail stores within the state"6 and
thereby benefits from activity in the state.
A second clearly identifiable constitutional test involves the use of
apportionment formulas. Succinctly stated, this test requires that the
apportionment formula be "reasonable."' ' 7 Montgomery Ward
stipulated that the three factor apportionment formula employed by the
Franchise Tax Board was reasonable.18
However, if the test is phrased in terms of what is "justly
attributable" to the state, 9 the inclusion of extra-territorial values in
the numerator of apportionment formulas may take on a constitutional
dimension. This position finds support in Wallace v. Hines,2 the case
principally relied upon by the taxpayer. That case involved a special
excise tax on doing business in the state, measured on capital invested
in the transaction of business in the state. The tax was apportioned by
means of the ratio of miles of track of the taxpayer-railroad within the
state to the total miles of track in all states. In holding the formula
unconstitutional as applied, the Court relied on three facts: first, the
cost of track was considerably less in North Dakota due to its
topography; second, the expensive terminals owned by the taxpayer were
located in other states; and third, the bonds held within the state were
secured by mortgage of lands in other states. Justice Holmes reasoned
for the Court that property located outside the state could not be "taken
13. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940); W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES To
OTHER STATES 9 (1963).
14. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435,445 (1940).
15. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,465 (1959).
16. 6 Cal. App. 3d 149, 153, 85 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (1970).
17. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 506 (1942).
18. 6 Cal. App. 3d 149, 153, 85 Cal. Rptr. 890, 894 (1970).
19. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 134 (1931). J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE
AND LOCAL TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1969).
20. 253 U.S. 66 (1920). For an analysis of the role that Wallace v. Hines plays in the historical
development of the problem of tax valuation under the unit rule, see 2 J. BONIRIGHT, THE




into account unless it [could] be seen in some plain and fairly intelligible
way that it adds to the value of the road and the rights exercised in
the state.12 1
The court in Montgomery Ward, while suggesting that constitutional
questions were at an end when the "nexus" and "reasonable formula"
tests were satisfied,2 alluded to the problem of establishing that the in-
transit goods added to the value of business done in the state.23 In light
of this allusion, the dismissal of appeal by the Supreme Court24 gives
no clear indication of the constitutional test to be employed in these
factual situations.
The taxpayer argued that the in-transit goods in no way contributed
to net income earned in California. The court replied that since the value
of the goods was included in the denominator of the property factor,
it should also be included in the numerator in the state to which the
goods were "appropriated for the production of income . . . . 5 The
court failed to explain how the value of these goods added to the business
done in the state during the taxing year. Notwithstanding this omission,
the court held that the taxpayer failed to meet his burden of proof by
clear and convincing evidence. This device for resolving the problem,
while not atypical in the interstate taxation cases,26 does not appear to
satisfy the test set out in Wallace v. Hines, i.e. that it must be shown
"in some plain and fairly intelligible way" that the goods add to the
value of the business done in the state. Goods in inventory within the
state are ordinarily available for immediate sale and reflect the volume
of business done in the state in the taxing year. The goods traveling in
interstate commerce to the state, but which have not yet arrived, are
21. Id. at 69.
22. 6 Cal. App. 3d 149, 158, 85 Cal. Rptr. 890, 897 (1970).
23. Id. at 159, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
24. 400 U.S. 913 (1970).
25. 6 Cal. App. 3d 149, 160, 85 Cal. Rptr. 890, 898 (1970).
26. See, e.g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120 (1920). Beaman
attacked the Supreme Court for using this approach:
The ultimate holding is that the taxpayer has failed to discharge his burden of proof.
This is arrived at in two steps. First, the court disposes of the contention that the formula
is ifvalid on its face by observing that a formula may not be judged in the abstract. Next,
the Court examines the contention that the formula in operation reaches an unreasonable
result. Without satisfactory standards for determining what would be a reasonable result,
the court finds itself powerless to say whether or not the result is unreasonable. Therefore
the Court arrives, essentially by a confession of ignoramus, at a finding that the taxpayer
has failed to prove the unreasonableness of the formula.
W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAxes To OTHER STATES (1963).
27. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 69 (1920).
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not immediately available for sale, nor can they be used in the business
during the taxable year. Moreover, the inclusion of the value of these
in-transit goods would seem to distort the property ratio. Such a
distortion would result because these goods are included in inventory
in the year in which they travel in interstate commerce and included
again in the year in which they arrive in the state. Depending on the
ratio of the value of goods in interstate commerce to the goods in
inventory in the state, the distortion could be substantial. To this
argument the court replied: "today's inventory does not include'today's
goods in transit. s28 In the next paragraph, however, the court held that
the inventory for the tax year included the goods in transit in interstate
commerce on the final day of the tax year.29
As a result of the Montgomery Ward decision, the taxpayer is placed
in the unenviable position of either paying the tax or avoiding it by
terminating orders or shipments due to arrive in the taxing year. Courts
then may be placed in the position of deciding whether goods ordered,
but not shipped for tax avoidance reasons, are "appropriated to the
production of income" in the state.
If the "nexus" and "reasonable formula" tests, both somewhat
threshold in nature, are all that is constitutionally required, only the
gross abuses of state taxing power could be constitutionally challenged,3"
and potential problems of the nature involved in Montgomery Ward
would remain to be corrected by state courts on state constitutional and
statutory grounds. A state could employ a reasonable formula, place
extra-territorial values in the numerator and increase its tax revenues
with impunity. A constitutional test requiring the income to be "justly
attributable" to the state provides a basis for a reasoned analysis of
the issues raised by the inclusion of certain values in the apportionment
ratio factors. Montgomery Ward leaves unanswered these serious
questions of an arguably constitutional nature.
28. 6 Cal. App. 3d 149, 162, 85 Cal. Rptr. 890, 900 (1970).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931), where the statutory
formula allocated approximately 80% of the net income of the corporation to the state but
operations within the state produced only 17% of the net income. The formula was invalidated
on the grounds that it was unconstitutional as applied.
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